RUPTURES
CONSOLIDATIONS
CONTINUITIES
Reconsidering
Global Economic Processes
after 1945

International Conference organised by Robert Heinze (University of Bern) and Patrick Neveling (Utrecht University)

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Speakers (in order of appearance):

Jennifer Bair (Boulder)  Leona Fink (Chicago)  Christian Gerlach (Bern)
Alina Cucu (Berlin)     Robert Heinze (Bern)     Mallika Shakya (New Delhi)
Patrick Neveling (Utrecht)  George Baca (Busan)       Jefferson Cowie (Nashville)
Gisela Hürlimann (Zurich)  Catherine Schenk (Glasgow)
This interdisciplinary, international conference will advance the debate about the periodisation of global economic processes after 1945. For this, we will bring together researchers from the social sciences and the humanities whose recent work goes beyond the predominant notion of a radical, world-historical rupture driven by crises in industrially advanced nations in the 1970s. Instead, contributors to this conference highlight the analytical gains from research and theories with emphasis on historical trajectories in the Global South, on a broader period in world history, and on analytical models of change that consider radical rupture as much as continuities and consolidations.

Such a debate is badly needed because mainstream research in the social sciences and humanities has, for more than a decade, followed the assumption of a radical shift from Keynesianism and Fordism to neoliberalism and post-Fordism in the 1970s. In history, several widely received and debated recent publications, such as Lutz Raphael and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel’s “Nach dem Boom”, Daniel Rodgers’ “Age of Fracture” and Morten Reitmayers and Thomas Schlemmer’s “Die Anfänge der Gegenwart” established that notion, building largely on empirical research in industrially advanced countries. Likewise, for social anthropology, sociology, and human geography influential monographs such as David Harvey’s “The Condition of Postmodernity” have established a narrative that posits radical ruptures as the world-shaping experience of the 1970s, which scholars across these disciplines have followed often unequivocally.

Increasingly, the supposed watershed-like character of events and the associated notions of systemic rupture are questioned, particularly regarding the singularity of the post-1970s experience in the global economy. This concerns the two oil crises of the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods System of fixed currency exchange rates as well as foundational concepts in the social sciences and humanities such as that of a flexibilisation of labour and employment and the rise of a neoliberal geography of capitalism shaped by high capital mobility. Importantly, new studies draw on global perspectives and reveal that the notion of a 1970s rupture is only partially sustainable. While it is viable for the analysis of particular regions in the industrial heartlands of advanced capitalist nations such as the US, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, it is less easily verified for the historical trajectories of developing nations.

Further, social anthropologists, historians and sociologists have begun to question a radical difference that has for long been posited as a defining feature of the capitalist and the socialist bloc economies, and instead look for the origins of neoliberal policies in socialist states since the 1950s. New studies reveal that there were indeed extended debates and collaborations between economists from both sides and historical research shows that the Soviet Union was an active and powerful agent in global (capitalist) trading, for example during the world food crisis in the early 1970s.

The conference therefore focuses on the continuities and interdependencies between different patterns of economic regulation, asking which shades of Fordism, Keynesianism, Neoliberalism, and so forth have emerged since 1945 and in what ways these have connected societies and economies worldwide. We intend to initiate a debate among scholars from different fields on similarities and differences among and across nations in the Global South and the North and how these continued, consolidated, and/or changed over the past seven decades.

Contributions to this conference will enquire the following, among other questions: Whether and to what extent did continuities of colonial and early post-colonial labour regimes and integration into global trading agreements prevail in the Global South?

To what extent does the impact of strategic policy changes, such as moving from import-substitution to export-oriented development, justify analytical concepts of rupture?

What role should we allocate to global policy projects, which conjured radical changes in global integration (i.e. for a new international economic order, for global socialism, for global neoliberalism) in periodising the era since 1945?

How did (and how does) public and academic opinion across the globe reflect on notions of continuity, consolidation and rupture?

Robert Heinze and Patrick Neveling
During the 1970s, a coalition of developing countries known as the G-77 launched a far-reaching effort at the United Nations to realize a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Insofar as the NIEO is remembered today at all, it is as the dying, desperate gasp of the post-war developmental paradigm. According to this periodization, starting with either the Bandung Conference in 1955 or the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, developing countries briefly attempted to leverage what they believed was their growing power within the international community to reform the global economy in ways that would enable them to realize economic, as well as political, self-determination. Just as the NIEO is seen as the apotheosis of this agenda, so too is its defeat taken to mark a dramatic transformation in the position of the Global South in the international political economy. In this paper, I will interrogate this periodization of the NIEO as the waning days of developmentalism via an inquiry into the changing conceptualization of development itself. Specifically, I trace the conceptualization of the right to development—what is it, who claims it, and how is it secured—through three United Nations documents (and the relationship among them): the 1974 "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," Human Rights Commission Resolution 32/130 in 1989, and the same Commission’s ultimately unsuccessful Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which were abandoned in 2006.
Fracture and Endurance in the Temporal and Territorial Logics of Socialist Industrialization

My presentation follows the unfolding of Romanian socialist industrialization, covering the period between the end of the Second World War and the erosion of state socialism in the 1970s–1980s. I investigate how the Romanian socialist state dealt with the consequences of a long and convoluted history of uneven and combined development and how this history carved the temporal and territorial logics of industrialization in post-1945 Romania.

In more concrete terms, I investigate how the Romanian industrialization produced a cheap and flexible labourforce, a labourforce with a remarkably robust structure over time. I argue that Romania not only lacked proletarians but also strategically postponed their making by relying instead on a particular rural-urban fabric that produced various forms of labour: wage labour, forced labour, and temporary or seasonal labour. Although this was discursively framed as an unfortunate necessity at the onset of primitive socialist accumulation in the 1950s, this reliance on a cheap and flexible workforce, who could partly secure its own reproduction, dominated the entire socialist period. It was eventually to be recognized as an official developmental strategy in the debates around the administrative and territorial systematization of the late 1960s.

This process suggests that we need a more nuanced understanding of post-1945 East-Central European history that goes both beyond its current framing as a variety of Fordism and beyond its reading in simplistic terms like “early” and “late” socialism. To achieve this, it is necessary to turn our attention to the local rationalities and practices around which the project of industrial socialism was articulated in the second part of the 20th century, and to their concrete temporal and territorial logics. For the Romanian case, this entails an engagement with the ways in which socialist industrialization was envisioned as a multi-stage process, which reflected at each step the choices made by the socialist state when planning for infrastructural works and regional development in relation to the reproduction and expansion of labour. It also requires a clear recognition of the strategic importance of the different rhythms of the nationalization of industrial means of production and of the collectivization of land.

Drawing on my own research and on recent findings in Romanian labour history, I suggest a reassessment of terms like “Fordism”/“post-Fordism” that have dominated global chronologies of labour over the past decades. Based on the teachings from the margins provided by a chronically understudied case like Romania, I question the idea that the 1970s constituted a radical departure from notions of “efficiency” and “flexibility” articulated previously. I argue that this “before and after” understanding of post-1945 global economic processes obscures the complex internal dynamics of accumulation in countries like Romania, which depended not only on a global Fordist vision of industrial relations but also on localized rationalities and practices. In light of these findings, previous periodizations of state socialism that have become influential in the scholarship on the region also appear as highly problematic, because they have been drawing on more obvious transformations in trade patterns, financial arrangements, and knowledge production, while neglecting the most enduring foundation of socialist accumulation: the reproduction and the expansion of labour.
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Relocating Capitalism, Consolidating Neoliberalism: The Global Spread of Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones since 1947

This presentation is based on a book project, which will offer a pioneering empirical study and analysis of a major development in the global political economy of capitalism after the Second World War; the rise of export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones (SEZs), which are set up by nation-states offering tax breaks and pre-built industrial infrastructure to bring in foreign-direct investment in manufacturing.

Based on worldwide ethnographic and archival research in various UN agencies, the World Bank, several nation-states, multinational corporations and development agencies, the presentation offers a historical anthropology of the global spread of EPZs and SEZs from the first zone in Puerto Rico in 1947 to 3,500 zones employing more than 70 million workers in more than 130 nation-states in the present.

Four crucial analytical points emerge from the global spread of EPZs and SEZs.

First, common periodizations of neoliberalism can be revised. Instead of a radical rupture in the 1970s it is suggested that a comprehensive neoliberal project for reorganizing global manufacturing began in the late 1940s.

Second, and building on this, a post-regulationist approach to global capitalism can be sketched, which focuses on struggles over how relations between capital, state and labor should be framed. In the global spread of EPZs and SEZs such struggles were closely related to international relations of the Cold War. Individuals, institutions, governments and corporations central for promoting EPZs and SEZs—such as the Boston-based consulting corporation Arthur D. Little, development agencies in Puerto Rico and Ireland, or the United Nations Industrial Development Organization—often worked in concert with US and other Western Cold War development programs like Point Four and the Alliance for Progress.

Third, the direction of the global spread of EPZs and SEZs is from periphery to center and this adds important data to David Harvey’s concept of the “historical geography of capitalism”, enabling us to say how this historical geography is “made” in the sphere of global light-industrial manufacturing.

Fourth and finally, this paper proposes a return to a historical materialist reading of world history as a history of (anti-)social movements in that it posits the global spread of EPZs as an example for the consolidation of neoliberalism from the 1970s onward. It thus reconstructs a history of struggle over the regulation of global economic processes since 1945 among a range of global (anti-) social alliances, each of which sought to embed local, national, and regional economies in a particular mode of global exchange.
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No Moral Issue Whatsoever? The Global Economy and the Entangled Swiss Worlds of Taxation, 1950s Onwards

“It should be stated at once that there is no moral issue whatsoever [...] in the attempt by countries outside of the United States tax jurisdiction to attract to themselves the incorporation or headquarter’s operation of base companies”, Robert A. Solo wrote in 1961. He continued: “Given these circumstances, it is a matter of indifference, insofar as the impact on the United States economy is concerned, where these base companies incorporate or operate, whether in Switzerland, Canada, Venezuela, Liberia or Puerto Rico or Mexico.”

Not everybody shared the views of Solo, an economist and former “New Dealer” who had also worked for Puerto Rico’s “Fomento” and later for the OECD. In the same year 1961, US President John F. Kennedy in his message to Congress explicitly linked his plan for tax reform to the need to contain the ongoing capital outflow as a consequence of the “unjustifiable use of tax havens such as Switzerland” for the escape of US-companies. By 1964, the West German government had joined in the criticism of Switzerland’s tax policies in a “tax haven report” that gave a detailed account of how foreign companies had flocked to the Swiss shores since the late 1950s. Beyond this rhetoric exhortation, states like France, Germany and the Netherlands followed the OECD’s advice to revise their Double Taxation Agreements (DTA) also with Switzerland in the 1960s. For the EEC, a coordinated DTA revision was one of the steps towards a tax harmonization within the community.

These examples give credit of interesting continuities in global economic processes since the 1950s: Not only the so-called second globalization since the 1970s, but already the boom of the post-WWII years was accompanied by the unfolding of new or the re-liberalization of former transnational financial investment and fiscal deferral practices. The criticism of and the attempts to (re)act against so-called tax havens are far from being a novelty neither. Other than in the 1960s or 1970s, though, the 2000s have witnessed a coordinated power play of fiscal governance to tackle “harmful tax competition” for the sake of market (rather than tax) justice. The paper will exemplify these interconnections, continuities and ruptures for the case of Switzerland, an early globalized SOE with a staunch federalist culture that lends itself as a prism for how global business, local tax laws and international foreign policy might interact.

1 Solo, Robert A., Economics of the International Base Company, in: National Tax Journal 144 (1961), pp. 70-80; here p. 75
3 Bericht der Bundesregierung über Wettbewerbsverfälschungen, die sich aus Sitzverlagerungen und aus dem zwischenstaatlichen Steuergefälle ergeben können, vom 23.8.1964 („Oasenbericht“).
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On the Geographical-Historical Conditions of RMB Internationalization

Termed by the Deutsche Bank (2014) as "the most significant global financial markets development since the formation of the Euro", the Chinese economic strategy to expand the global usage of the Chinese currency—the renminbi (RMB)—has attracted growing research interest. Rolled out on an intensifying basis after the 2008 global financial crisis, this strategy is globally significant because it presents fresh opportunities for capturing growth both offshore (primarily in financial centres) and onshore (in targeted locations within China). At the same time, there is uncertainty over the rationale and impact of this development. A segment of academia and policymaking circles construes RMB internationalization as a chronologically linear and inevitable movement towards free currency convertibility. At once historically-grounded and teleological, this interpretation derives from the post-WWII evolution of the US dollar from a domestic to a freely-traded “reserve” currency of the world, and assumes any subsequent internationalization process should arrive at the same outcome.

An emergent empirical pattern suggests, however, RMB internationalization is not evolving towards the same endpoint. Geographically, its global reach is selective, involving unique connections between global financial centres designated by Beijing and selected territories within mainland China. Historically it is becoming clear that RMB internationalization is a new strategy for the Chinese party-state to fortify its control over financial capital within a context of intensifying global economic integration. This in itself is part of a broader, path-dependent process to reproduce Mao-styled “state capitalism”. Between 1949 and the early 1980s, credit provision was a function of the fiscal system, which in turn fortified state control over prices and resource distribution. While the banking system was decoupled from the fiscal system after 1978, the Communist Party of China (CPC) continued to control financial capital through a twofold policy of direct participation (through the “Big Four” state-owned banks) and administrative regulation (multiple policies to facilitate financial repression at the national, provincial and municipal scales). This persistent control was explicitly emphasized during the summer of 2015, when the Chinese government pledged to intervene in domestic financial markets whenever it deems “necessary”.

This paper aims to evaluate RMB internationalization on the basis of its geographical and historical conditions. The discussion will be laid out in three parts that build on one another incrementally, namely (a) a review of how the “internationalization” concept is used in economic studies, and an evaluation of its commensurability with RMB internationalization; (b) a delineation of path-dependent financial regulation in post-Mao China, with particular emphasis on how the fixed exchange rate regime and credit provision enable the party-state to retain Mao-styled “fiscalization” of the financial system within the context of global economic integration; and (c) an evaluation of whether the political rationale of RMB internationalization—the enhancement of “state capitalism” and hence the legitimacy of the CPC—heralds an historically-inevitable shift towards capital account convertibility. If the history of the US dollar was a guide, full convertibility was and remains an important precondition for the formation of a global reserve currency. That this is not occurring in tandem with RMB internationalization is telling. Viewed collectively, the three parts of the paper embed the RMB internationalization process within the economic history of post-1949 China and concludes that a new monetary standard is not in the making.
Looking backwards, it seems clear that in a broad and sweeping transformation, a “post-war order” of extensive labor influence associated with the heyday of “social democracy” in Europe and a fulsome welfare state elsewhere—what French demographer Jean Fourastié called les trentes glorieuses and historians Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo labelled the Great Compression—became quickly frayed by forces beyond the control of labor-allied industrial or national political forces. Indeed, it is now commonplace to speak of a transition in socio-economic policy from Social Democracy to Neoliberalism. The decline of the trade unions as an organized social bloc and vector of political influence is most commonly and obviously associated with “de-industrialization” accompanying the liberalization of investment and opening of new manufacturing markets in the “developing” world associated with “globalization.” In this essay, I mean to reassess the model of opposing post-war eras. Rather than a shift in political-economic assumptions from the Boom Era (Age of Compression) to Boom’s End (Neoliberalism), I emphasize enduring tensions in ideology and practice already apparent by the end of World War II at the very re-creation of the capitalist world economy. Both eras, I argue, were fundamentally conditioned by national accommodations to a world-economic market always tilting ideologically towards free trade. Furthermore, I suggest that labor movements and the West’s non-Communist Left only slowly and inadequately ever addressed the contradictions built into the international postwar order in which they occupied a vital part. Indeed, for these forces free trade was initially projected as part of larger social-democratic frame that included labor regulations, strong unions, and redistributive politics; only later did it become reviled as a leading wedge of neoliberal revanchism. Correction of the current drift and decline of labor-based social movements, the paper suggests, might begin, in part, with a historically grounded review of the fault lines of our current predicament.
“Plus ça reste, plus ça change”: Infrastructure and the Periodisation of African Economic History

Classic studies in post-1945 African economic history have established a paradigm of “Development and disappointment” (Cooper 2002): a “neo-mercantilism” after the war, a short growth phase dominated by efforts at diversification and import substitution in the 1960s, followed by the oil crises and the “lost decade” of the 1980s (Asche 2012). This paper, however, takes a more detailed look at these phases and reveals the contradictory and piecemeal nature of said policies. The paper argues that the history of African economies is formed by their continued dependent position in the capitalist world system, which is arguably a stronger factor than neoliberalism (which the “development and disappointment”-paradigm emphasizes).

In particular, colonial powers often changed their policies in Africa according to the economic needs of the metropole. Despite the strong increase in public expenditure on African development and favourable conditions for African exports after 1945, practices such as the French pairing of African exports with correlating imports from the metropole or the elimination of free convertibility of currencies ensured the extractive nature and continued dependency of African economies. From 1946 on, beginning with the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme, projects to modernise agriculture and establish the infrastructure necessary for industrial development failed spectacularly – even though many of these had been globally promoted as lighthouse initiatives and had received huge external funding. Following that, the idea of a developmentalist late colonial state can be questioned.

The paper traces the contradiction between developmentalist idea and exploitative practice by looking at the social and economic processes playing out in African cities. Urban administrations had for a long time ignored significant urban growth. Although efforts at urban planning increased after 1945, they were seldomly put into place. Instead, developmentalist colonial and national infrastructure projects favoured extractive industries. African urban dwellers were simply treated as a labor reserve. The lack of public services, the extractive nature of industry and infrastructure and the failings of urban planning enabled irregular, “informal” economic activity to spread. Shifting the focus from European colonial policies after the war to an analysis of everyday social and economic life in Africa, the paper shows the piecemeal nature of developmentalist policies and the large gaps between state efforts to “develop” African economies and actual social and economic processes.

These contradictory tendencies lead me to pose the question whether the “development era” from 1940–1973 (Cooper 2002) was an extraordinary period in African history, cut short by global economic crises, or whether the continent’s contemporary history can be analysed as shaped by a continuity of dependency that bridged the two periods, laying the basis for many of the phenomena that today are seen as typical consequences of neoliberal global policies in Africa.
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Keynesianism’s Imperialist Underbelly: Witch-Hunts and Miracles in South Korea

It has become an intellectual fad for social scientists to use the idea of neoliberalism to present contemporary capitalism as if it represents a dangerous rupture, or a “crisis,” that could bring irreparable harm if democratic governments do not develop regulatory policies to contain the recklessness of “free markets.” This sense of emergency among left-leaning academics builds on the idea that Keynesian economic policies of the 1940s and 1950s brought about the grand bargain between labor and capital that created the great prosperity of “Fordism.” David Harvey exemplifies such a stark periodization in his oft-quoted claim that neoliberalism represents the “restoration of class power.” By presenting the 1970s as a dramatic shift in the global political economy, Harvey idealizes Keynesianism as if it represented a diminishment of power among the elite in the U.S. and Europe. Instead, the industrial leaders in the U.S. and Europe found Keynesianism a powerful mechanism to restore the order of global capitalism following the catastrophes world wars and the Great Depression. The U.S. State Department, for example, underwrote Keynesian reforms of capitalism at home with a vast imperial project in East Asia. South Korea became the centerpiece of these interconnecting Cold War projects of Keynesianism at home and imperialism in ex-colonies. The U.S. Occupation of South Korea led to the building of the Republic of Korea as the paradigmatic Cold War State. State Department planners used the U.S. military to establish South Korea as a buffer state to shield the rebuilding of industrial Japan from the “threat” of global communism. I will examine this transformation by making explicit the connections between Fordist policies in the Western homefront and anti-communist witch-hunts in South Korea. In this Cold War context, Park Chung Hee led a coup d’état in 1961 and established his development-oriented dictatorship and launched South Korea’s “economic miracle.” By the 1980s, South Korea had joined the club of industrialized nation-states, yet had faced acute problems of legitimacy in the face of the democracy movement and a powerful labor movement. As the South Korean elite struggled to maintain control of the student and labor movements, they found neoliberal policies as valuable resources for consolidating its rule and incorporating the ideals of the democracy movement. Rather than a “break” with the previous administration, political and economic leaders used certain neoliberal policies to strengthen South Korea’s Cold War state amidst the dislocating effects of the social upheaval represented by the democracy movement.
Reinventing the International Monetary and Financial System in the 1970s: Continuities and Complexities

The end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 is often viewed as a major turning point in the organisation of the global economy. After struggling for close to a decade, the pegged exchange rate regime based on gold convertibility of the US dollar was suspended unilaterally by the Nixon government in August 1971. The restoration of exchange rate parities with wider bands under the Smithsonian Agreement of December of that year demonstrated the tenacious preference for pegged exchange rates, but it was too fragile to survive the loss of credibility in the system. From June 1972 the sterling exchange rate floated free of its dollar peg and other countries followed by the spring of 1973. This is usually considered to mark the beginning of a new era of floating exchange rates and a new solution to the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma: open capital markets, floating exchange rates and monetary policy sovereignty, which paved the way for the neo-liberal revival in policy-making.

Looking more closely at the 1970s from the perspective of developing economies, however, it is clear that most countries continued to seek pegged exchange rates and that the transition to financial liberalisation was much more uneven and incomplete by the 1980s. In addition, West European states moved deliberately to stabilise exchange rates through the Snake. At the same time, shocks to the international financial market prompted a reassessment of the regulatory reach for international banking. A series of bank failures (and near misses) in 1974 led G10 central banks to create the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and central banks extended and formalised their regulatory and supervisory powers. A final crucial dimension of this era is the reliance on private capital markets to rebalance the global economy in the wake of the oil price shock of 1974, leading ultimately to the developing country sovereign debt crisis of 1982.

This paper reassesses the evolution of the global economy in the 1970s from three inter-related perspectives: international monetary regime, international banking regulation and international capital markets. Drawing on archive evidence from the International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements and national central banks, it seeks to challenge the view that there was a radical departure toward neo-liberalism in this decade by focusing on interactions between advanced industrialised countries and developing economies during this period. Thus, the adoption of floating exchange rates was not universal, the extension of regulatory power and oversight over the international banking system was reluctant and incomplete and the risks to global stability posed by the ‘privatisation’ of development finance through US and European banks was clearly identified and recognised as early as 1975 but no action was taken. Paul Volcker’s monetarist policy revolution in 1979 then tipped the debt problem into a crisis that transformed sovereign debt markets permanently.
A Turning Point in Energy History and International Relations? Reviewing the First Oil Crises 1973/74

In 1976 the eminent American political economist Raymond Vernon admitted self-reflectionally that members of his profession exhibited a tendency to dramatize and overestimate the significance of the crises they experienced. Many of the alleged epochal breaks they announced would later turn out to be negligible. Yet, he continued that “the events in the oil market that drew the world’s attention in the months following October 1973, […] may prove to have a more enduring significance.” In the 1970s, many political and economic observers reached the similar conclusion that the oil crisis marked a fundamental watershed in the history of international relations. With the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, a group of new and powerful actors entered the international arena that could not easily be understood in the binary logic of the Cold War. Moreover, together with the growing concerns over the alleged “limits to growth” and the ecological consequences of the excessive use of fossil fuels in the processes of industrialization and globalization, the first oil crisis also seemed to mark an even grander shift in the relation between humanity and the environment. Analyzing the world of oil in the 20th Century as well as the mainly Western reactions to the oil and energy crises in the 1970s, in my paper, I will examine and nuance these claims arguing that significant transformations took place in the 1970s but that they started earlier and were neither as sudden and unexpected nor as all-pervasive and fundamental as it is often claimed.
The paper discusses a number of interrelated phenomena in the 1970s. I will argue that the world food crisis, 1972–75, did mark profound changes in the international trade with grains and related products. What was altered was a pattern in the world grain markets that had originated with their emergence in the 1860s–70s and that was modified by way of dumping grains through food aid to Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1950s. Two groups of countries emerged as major importing regions in the 1970s: the socialist countries and non-industrialized countries. Among other things, the world food crisis also led to capital concentration among grain trading firms and (as a consequence of a temporary U.S. export ban on soybean products) to a shift of the international soy production from the USA to South America.

However, though the world food crisis was also a catalyst for the breakthrough of the basic needs strategy and the “small peasants approach” in development policies on an international level, it is not so clear whether these policies had substantial effects in real national grain economies. In other words, it is doubtful if they led to modernizing and expanding production in non-industrialized countries in the short-term and medium-term. It is doubtful although nominally considerable resources were transferred in the 1970s (and even later) into agricultural development of non-industrialized countries, which was one way how some actors used the petrodollars accumulating with big banks after 1973 and contributed substantially to the debt problem of many non-industrialized countries in the 1980s.

Geographically speaking, the paper tries to connect developments in capitalist industrial economies, non-industrialized countries and socialist industrial states. It is an attempt to distinguish between policies and outcomes and will place processes in the area of food and development policies in the context of a number of broader economic and social developments.
This paper will discuss the periodicity of global economic processes through a case study of the trade union movement in Nepal which is then contextualized within the Global South. If the period around 1945 marks the war era for Euro-America, its aftermaths manifest as the end of colonialism for much of South Asia and the Global South. In this paper, I discuss the so-called third world discourses on industrialization and industrial relations that followed the rise of the new states. A useful starting point for my ethnography is to probe the conditions of the 1950s which might have influenced a set of courses of action later leading to the kind of union uprising we witness half a century later. Within Nepal, the union uprising of 2006 was noted for its strong anti-incumbency posture against the mainstream unions. At one level, it protested the global trade politics such as Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the rise of World Trade Organization, which first made labour precarious and later dismantled the industry altogether. At another level, this uprising soon morphed into a national movement calling for a regime change, from liberal democracy under a Hindu monarchy to a secular and multi-ethnic republic with a strong left orientation.

In historicizing this union uprising in Nepal, I consider what Michael Herzfeld (2005) said, that geographies that were not directly colonized but still kept under colonial influence, or “crypto-colonies” as he put it, are doubly victimized. Not only have they suffered the effects of colonialism itself, but they have also found themselves excluded from the global struggle against colonialism in the 1950s while being directly exposed to the rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s. Nepal has seen a renewed interest in Marxism and even Maoism as it makes sense of its national history within South Asia and the Global South.

I examine the trade union movement in Nepal to discuss what Kozloff (2008) called “new Left” for South America and what von Holdt (2002) called “social movement unionism” for South Africa. These new movements mark a fusion of indigenous rights movements, call for an end to de facto and de jure apartheid involving caste and race, and resistance to hegemonic neoliberalism. The trade union did not confine itself to collective bargaining but marched on the streets to demand that the state recognize the alienation felt by the disenfranchised workers but also the marginalized ethnic and regional groups as well as the oppressed gender. A comparative phenomenon is noted elsewhere, including for example the Marikana uprising in South Africa, which also challenged the trade union’s status quo while questioning the liberal hijacking of the revolutions of the 1990s. Like in Nepal, the new union later associated itself with broader economic agendas such as nationalization of mines. I situate the embedded nature of the uprisings seen around the turn of the millennium to argue that their anti-incumbent posture might point to the disillusionment rooted in the fact that the neoliberal promises sold to them during the regime changes forged in the 1990s have proven hollow.
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Global Economics, Local Identities: The U.S. Political Backlash from Truman to Trump

The recent and dramatic backlash against the global economic order in the United States seen in the rise of the Tea Party and, most dramatically, Donald Trump’s successful race to become the Republican presidential nominee, represents both continuity and disruption in the history of US political economy. While a strong historical current of backlash populism can be seen during the rise of the New Deal and even throughout the postwar “golden age”—becoming heightened quite dramatically after the civil rights movement—it was globalization without a social dimension that triggered the most recent, and most profound, wave of populist conservatism. In short, globalization (which includes immigration) catalyzed a long standing conservative formula into a formidable and combustible political movement in the United States.

Backlash populism has a long history in the United States. In the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt successfully fought off populist attacks on the New Deal stemming most notably from Father Coughlin, “Detroit’s Radio Priest,” and even from the great CIO and mineworkers’ leader, John L. Lewis. The House Un-American Activities Committee, which began during the New Deal and flourished in the postwar era, provided a useful foundation for Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-communist witch hunts. While cloaked in anti-communist sentiments, these actors often sought to restrain the growth of the state and labor rather more than they wanted to search out communists per se. With the rise of the civil rights movement, backlash populism found its most powerful voice in the figure of segregationist presidential candidate, Governor George Wallace of Alabama. Wallace’s main campaign slogan, “Stand Up for America”, delivered him to a three way tie in the 1972 Democratic Primary with George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey before he was crippled by a would-be assassin’s bullet just after winning the Michigan primary. In the 1970s and 1980s, Richard Nixon, and then Ronald Reagan, took key elements of Wallace’s blue collar populism to attract blue-collar voters away from the Democrats and to the Republicans.

These populist conservative sympathies, never far from the surface in American populism, accelerated with the rise of the global economy, turning continuity into rupture. The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994) and China’s entry into the WTO (2001), both under Clinton, launched a sense of betrayal among the white working-class, which became organized into what Robert Reich has called the “counter-reaction” to the centripetal forces of global economic developments. Nationalism, ethno-fundamentalism, and religious values, became the grounding sources of identity in a dizzying global economic system in which even the nation state’s capacities seemed sold out to the power of global economic forces.

Thus the vigor, but not the origin, of the new populism rests directly upon the new economics: a fear and distrust of big money (while simultaneously embracing a business person to fix it); belief that the state works for “others”—immigrants, minorities, and global corporations; distrust of the party system, both sides of which embraced the global order; frustration with “diversity” at home and abroad; and, most importantly, fear of American decline in the global world—from the national to the local levels. The central theme in Donald Trump’s successful capture of the Republican Party is a belligerent nationalism—the opposite of cosmopolitan forms of globalization.
While the Democratic Party embraces global free trade and diversity, the Republican Party—especially its Tea Party wing—embraces a contradictory package of global free trade and ethno-fundamentalist backlash. Since neither party has placed the economic concerns of working class voters anywhere on their agendas, the system fuels working-class anger just as quickly as it hollows out factories and downtowns of the old industrial heartland.

In 2008, candidate Barack Obama caught a firestorm of controversy when he invoked this very logic, having to recant and backpedal on what was essentially a fair rendering of the truth:

“You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania and, like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for 25 years and nothing’s replaced them. And they fell through the Clinton administration, and the Bush administration, and each successive administration has said that somehow these communities are gonna regenerate and they have not.

And it’s not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy toward people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.”

The irony is that little changed under Obama, except for the heightened fears that the nation had been hijacked by a president of allegedly dubious national origin.

Chairs (in order of appearance):

Luisa Piart
Assistant Professor, Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Bern
www.anthro.unibe.ch/about_us/people/luisa_piart_ma/index_eng.html

Benjamin Brühwiler
Researcher, Department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Amsterdam
https://dg.philhist.unibas.ch/departement/personen/person-details/profil/person/bruehwiler

Jonas Flury
Researcher, Historical Institute, University of Bern
www.hist.unibe.ch/ueber_uns/personen/flury_jonas/index_ger.html

Stella Krepp
Assistant Professor, Historical Institute, University of Bern
www.hist.unibe.ch/ueber_uns/personen/krepp_stella/index_ger.html

Magaly Tornay
Researcher, ETH Zurich
www.tg.ethz.ch/en/people/details/magaly-tornay
Programme

**Tuesday, June 28th**

13:00 Registration

13:30–14:15
Welcome (Britta Sweers, Director CGS), Conference introduction: Robert Heinze, Patrick Neveling

**Session I**
Chair: Luisa Piart, University of Bern

14:30–15:20
Jennifer Lynn Bair, University of Colorado at Boulder
*Whose Right to Develop? The NIEO, the United Nations and the Emergence of the Human Right to Development*

15:20–16:10
Alina Cucu, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
*Fracture and Endurance in the Temporal and Territorial Logics of Socialist Industrialization*

15:20–16:30 Coffee Break

16:30–17:20
Patrick Neveling, Utrecht University
*Relocating Capitalism, Consolidating Neoliberalism: The Global Spread of Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones since 1947*

17:20–18:20
Roundtable discussion
Jennifer Bair, Alina Cucu, Patrick Neveling

19:30 Conference Dinner

**Wednesday, June 29th**

**Session II**
Chair: Benjamin Brühwiler, University of Amsterdam

09:30–10:20
Gisela Hürlimann, ETH Zurich
*No Moral Issue Whatsoever? The Global Economy and the Entangled Swiss Worlds of Taxation, 1950s Onwards*

10:20–11:10
Kean Fan Lim, University of Nottingham
*On the Geographical-Historical Conditions of RMB Internationalization*

11:10–11:30 Coffee Break

11:30–12:20
Roundtable discussion
Gisela Hürlimann, Kean Fan Lim

12:20–13:40 Lunch

**Session III**
Chair: Jonas Flury, University of Bern

13:40–14:30
Leon Fink, University of Illinois at Chicago
*Neoliberalism Before Its Time? Labor and the Free Trade Ideal in the Era of the “Great Compression”, 1945-1972*

14:30–15:20
Robert Heinze, University of Bern
*“Plus ça reste, plus ça change”: Infrastructure and the Periodisation of African Economic History*

15:20–15:50 Coffee Break

15:50–16:40
George Baca, Dong-A University, South Korea
*Keynesianism’s Imperialist Underbelly: Witch-Hunts and Miracles in South Korea*

16:40–17:40
Roundtable discussion
Leon Fink, Robert Heinze, George Baca

19:00 Dinner

**Thursday, June 30th**

**Session IV**
Chair: Stella Krepp, University of Bern

09:00–9:50
Catherine Schenk, University of Glasgow
*Reinventing the International Monetary and Financial System in the 1970s: Continuities and Complexities*

09:50–10:40
Rüdiger Graf, Centre for Contemporary History, Potsdam
*A Turning Point in Energy History and International Relations? Reviewing the First Oil Crises 1973/74*

10:40–11:10 Coffee Break

11:10–12:00
Christian Gerlach, University of Bern
*The Global Grain Economy in the 1970s: Changes and Continuities*

12:00–13:00
Roundtable discussion
Catherine Schenk, Rüdiger Graf, Christian Gerlach

13:00–14:30 Lunch

**Session V**
Chair: Magaly Tornay, ETH Zurich

14:30–15:20
Mallika Shakya, South Asia University, New Delhi
*Different Ruptures – Trade Union Movements in the Global South*

15:20–16:10
Jefferson Cowie, Vanderbuilt University
*Global Economics, Local Identities: The U.S. Political Backlash from Truman to Trump*

16:10–16:30 Coffee Break

16:30–17:20
Roundtable
Jefferson Cowie, Mallika Shakya

17:20–18:10
Final Discussion, Plans for Publication(s), Farewell

19:30 Dinner
Conference Venue

Universität Bern, UniS, Schanzeneckstrasse

From Berne Main Station, take Bus No. 12 to Länggasse. Get off at Stop “Universität”, walk back a few meters, then turn right into Schanzenstrasse, where you will see the UniS building. The conference takes place in Room A 222, on the main second floor. Alternatively, from the train station exits to Laenggasse, the conference venue is within a five minutes walking distance—uphill.