

Länder and the Foundation of West Germany 1948–1951,” is slightly mislabeled, as the BdL was replaced by the Bundesbank only in 1957. Mee ably highlights the ongoing political and public debate about the 1951 Bundesbank transition law and the independence of the central bank, but the chapter shows some weakness in regard to details of postwar German history. For example, there were not “3.6 million refugees fleeing Germany’s former eastern territories” (147); some 9–10 million fled or were expelled from these territories, while 3.6 million people is the approximate number of people who fled the territory of the GDR between 1945 and 1961. Similarly, while Mee underlines the Allied High Commission’s letter of March 6, 1951, which declared that they would give up their oversight of the Bank deutscher Länder (BdL), he neglects to mention Adenauer’s letter of the same day, which acknowledged Germany’s pre- and post-war foreign debt. Most historians agree that Adenauer’s letter had a far greater impact on the Federal Republic’s economic and political recovery. Chapter 3, “Adenauer’s Challenge: The Gürzenich Affair and the Bank deutscher Länder 1956–1957,” is similarly mislabeled. Although it covers the debates prior to Adenauer’s infamous speech, it fails to explain why the public reputation of the BdL had increased so much from its poor start in 1948–51. While aspects of the ongoing debate about the political independence of the future Bundesbank are well summarized, other areas are not. Pressure on the Deutschmark caused by the *Juliusturm*—the finance minister’s accumulated fund, stashed away for the upcoming West German rearmament—is not mentioned, nor is the impact of West Germany’s fast-growing balance of payment surplus. Both created massive pressure to revalue the Deutschmark. More importantly, Mee reduces Adenauer’s speech to a criticism of the BdL, when it was in fact directed at Economics Minister Erhard in at least equal measure.

At first glance, the book’s fourth chapter, “Shadow of National Socialism: Karl Blessing and the Bundesbank in 1965,” has very little to do with central bank independence. Instead, it deals with the Nazi past of the Bundesbank’s first president, Karl Blessing, who had been a member of Heinrich Himmler’s *Freundeskreis*. However, the chapter provides a very insightful look into the Bundesbank’s proactive handling of media and the press. In a second line of inquiry, the chapter analyzes the Bundesbank’s reaction to currency convertibility (1958), the Deutschmark’s second revaluation (1969), and the end of the Bretton Woods system. In all three cases, the underlying macroeconomic issues and resulting political decisions are mentioned only in passing. Chapter 5, “Bundesbank, Social Democracy and the Era of the ‘Great Inflation’ 1970–1978,” is the book’s strongest and most cohesive chapter. It analyses the alterations in management and policy at the bank under the leadership of Karl Klasen and

Otmar Emminger, following the change in government of 1969. Only in this chapter does Mee mention that Klasen’s and Emminger’s predecessors at the BdL and Bundesbank, Wilhelm Vocke and Karl Blessing, were motivated in their quest for monetary stability by their belief in the gold standard and fixed exchange rates. Up to this point, the book refers instead to the cliché of “the two German inflations” (1923 and 1948) and public fear of repetition as the cause of the bank’s *Stabilitätspolitik*.

The omissions mentioned above—in particular, the failure to consider the impact that wider political and economic factors had on the events under discussion—prevent the book from reaching its potential. In too many places, the journalistic writing style, scores of superfluous rhetorical questions, unnecessary repetitions, and occasionally sloppy editing detract from Mee’s efforts. Despite this criticism, the book is a valuable addition to the literature on one of Germany’s best-known institutions, as it highlights a pattern of argument and behavior by the leaders of West Germany’s central bank and in so doing, helps to dispel some of the institution’s enduring myths.

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MORITZ VON BRESCIUS. *German Science in the Age of Empire: Enterprise, Opportunity and the Schlagintweit Brothers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xiv, 414. Cloth \$120.00.

In *German Science in the Age of Empire*, Moritz von Brescius explores the “logics and contradictions of transnational science” through the expeditions and exploits of the Bavaria-born Schlagintweit brothers (3). While little-remembered today, the brothers found themselves at the center of international controversy in the latter half of the 1850s, and the debates over their methods and findings played a crucial role in the development of field sciences, museology, and the practice of European imperialism.

Brescius has chosen his subjects well. His account of the Schlagintweits’ expeditions in South and Central Asia (1854–57) explores a critical transitional period in European history, several of them, in fact—from Humboldtian natural science to the era of specialization; from systems of patronage based on state sponsorship to a market for science as a commodity for the growing middle class; from a cultural form of German national identity to a more statist nationalism; from the imperialism of the British East India Company to the raj. As Germans in the employ of the East India Company (EIC), with joint sponsorship from the Prussian crown, working with a virtual army of indigenous laborers, the brothers’ story is revealing about the “transnational nature of British Imperialism” and European science in the nineteenth century (74).

The brothers—Hermann, Robert, and Adolph—secured support for their ambitious plans through a complex web of patronage systems that allowed them maximum flexibility, as they played one patron off against another, but which also ultimately left them exposed to charges of unprofessional and unethical dealings and cast a shadow on the fruits of their scientific labors. The brothers' introduction into the republic of letters and the wider European scientific community was generously facilitated by Alexander von Humboldt, who saw the brothers' ambitions as an extension of his own prolific scientific—and even philosophical and aesthetic—projects. Their chief financial sponsor was the EIC, which employed numerous German scholars in the company's vast network of scientific and economic laborers in India. Germans were often regarded as ideal employees for the EIC because of their high level of academic training, their general identification with European imperial ideology, and because, unlike the French, they were thought to present no threat to British imperial interests. This German interest, however, was on the rise, and the Prussian state's minimal support of the brothers' project represented an investment in enhanced European and world status.

As the brothers' ranged widely across South and Central Asia, pressing dangerously into jealously guarded Chinese territory, they relied heavily on a network of scientific workstations, imperial agents, and native assistants. Brescius examines the brothers' relationships with their native assistants within the larger context of "intimate violence" between European officials and their native employees, but cautions against the simplistic reduction of the natives to mere instruments of colonial power. Native merchants such as Mohammad Amin and scholars such as Sayad Muhammad Said, who accompanied the brothers back to Europe and lectured at the University of Berlin, worked with the Schlagintweits as vital collaborators. The cousins Mani and Nain Singh acted as indispensable intermediaries between the brothers and regional political leaders, skillfully extracting the German naturalists from some perilous situations. Native intermediaries could only do so much—Adolph Schlagintweit was detained and executed as a presumed British spy in Kashgar in 1857, a consequence of the brothers' employment in the affairs of the EIC.

The reception of the brothers' work upon their return to Europe, especially in Britain, was filtered through the public reaction to the Indian uprising of 1857. British scholars had been critical from the beginning of the EIC's support of German scholars and the lack of respect shown to "English merit" and "English service" (246), and these voices became more prominent in the context of increasing insecurity about British power and prestige—political, economic, and cultural—in India. At the same time, the brothers were lionized in the German press and popular literature. Even in Germany, however,

the brothers' work was not universally well received, as increasing academic specialization fueled turf wars between the advocates of emerging subdisciplines and the champions of older, Humboldtian natural science.

Despite the close similarity in titles, *German Science in the Age of Empire* draws very little from Suzanne Marchand's important work *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire* (2009). This is unfortunate, not least because the most successful and influential of the Schlagintweit brothers was the youngest, Emil, who became a renowned Tibetologist. More importantly, a deeper engagement with Marchand's book—as well as several others that appear in the bibliography but are not cited in the text—would have allowed Brescius to draw the important historical connections between the developments in field sciences and museology in the mid-nineteenth century to the developments in comparative philology about a generation earlier. The development of German Indology, for example, preceded and directly paralleled the developments with which Brescius is concerned, although without the fieldwork. German philologists came into prominence in large part due to the patronage of another Humboldt, Wilhelm; drew heavily on work done by British and French imperial officials and scholars; and witnessed the transition from amateur orientalism to institutionalization and academic specialization. While German philologists in the 1790s and early 1800s were influenced by the work of the Frenchman Abraham Anquetil du Perron and the Englishman Sir William Jones, it was the German philologist Max Müller—who had worked closely with the EIC—who became the first chair in comparative philology at Oxford in 1868. Philology was a "transnational science" connected to European imperialism well before mid-century. These developments need more consideration.

*German Science in the Age of Empire* is a revised version of Moritz von Brescius's doctoral dissertation, and it often reads like one. It is, however, unquestionably a significant contribution to the history of science in modern Europe and the history of European imperialism—it is, in fact, an important illustration of how they are inextricably linked.

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BRENDAN SIMMS. *Hitler: A Global Biography*. New York: Basic Books, 2019. Pp. xxv, 668. Cloth \$40.00.

Is there still something to be said about Adolf Hitler? Twenty years ago most historians thought the last word had been given by Ian Kershaw. But since then, research and writing has continued, sometimes with important and fruitful results—as in Thomas Weber's work—and sometimes only emphasizing that at least one of the big four—Konrad Heiden, Alan Bullock, Joachim Fest, and Kershaw—has already covered the